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Abstract
We introduce a new model for program obfuscation, called mediated obfuscation. A
mediated obfuscation is a 3-party protocol for evaluating an obfuscated program that
requires minimal interaction and limited trust. The party who originally supplies the
obfuscated program need not be online when the client wants to evaluate the program.
A semi-trusted third-party mediator allows the client to evaluate the program, while
learning nothing about the obfuscated program or the client’s inputs and outputs. Mediated
obfuscation would provide the ability for a software vendor to safely outsource the less
savory aspects (like accounting of usage statistics, and remaining online to facilitate access)
of “renting out” access to proprietary software.
We give security definitions for this new obfuscation paradigm, and then present a
simple and generic construction based on functional encryption. If a functional encryption
scheme supports decryption functionality F (m, k), then our construction yields a mediated
obfuscation of the class of functions {F (m, ·) | m}. In our construction, the interaction
between the client and the mediator is minimal (much more efficient than a generalpurpose multi-party computation protocol). Instantiating with existing FE constructions,
we achieve obfuscation for point-functions with output (under a strong “virtual black-box”
notion of security), and a general feasibility result for obfuscating conjunctive normal form
and disjunctive normal form formulae (under a weaker “semantic” notion of security).
Finally, we use mediated obfuscation to illustrate a connection between worst-case
and average-case static obfuscation.

In short, an average-case (static) obfuscation of

some component of a suitable functional encryption scheme yields a worst-case (static)
obfuscation for a related class of functions. We use this connection to demonstrate new
impossibility results for average-case (static) obfuscation.
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Chapter 1

Introduction
Cryptography is a means for controlling access to information. Traditionally, encrypted data
is both useless to unauthorized parties and fully accessible to authorized users. However,
there are many natural applications for encryption schemes that relax these restrictions.
Functional encryption (FE) [BSW11a, O’N10] is a new class of encryption which
refines cryptography’s traditional “all-or-nothing” pattern. Broadly speaking, a functional
encryption system allows different users to hold unique secret keys which decrypt arbitrary
functions of the plaintext.
Functional encryption has many potential applications. For example, consider a large,
cloud-hosted, encrypted database of student information that contains both academic and
financial data. Here, the level of access required by teachers and accountants is different:
teachers only need to access the grades of students in their classes, while accountants only
need to access student financial reports. Traditionally, this access policy would be enforced
by storing the data on a trusted server that both authenticates users and supplies them
with appropriate content. However, in a cloud-based model, it may be undesirable to
outsource this level of trust in addition to data storage. In this case, the standard “all-ornothing” model is insufficient, because all key holders (i.e., both teachers and accountants)
can decrypt the entire student database. Functional encryption provides an alternative
approach: users get keys that only allow them to decrypt appropriate content.
In this work, we apply functional encryption to the problem of program obfuscation.
Informally, the goal of obfuscation is to make the source code of a program “unintelligible”
without altering its functionality. Though theoretical results such as the undecidability of
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the H ALTING P ROBLEM and the conjectured difficulty of B OOLEAN S ATISFIABILITY suggest
that computer programs are fundamentally difficult to interpret, in practice computer
programs are routinely analyzed1 by studying their source code. This poses a problem
for software vendors who want to create and distribute programs without revealing the
(potentially valuable) details of their implementation. Though some software vendors have
addressed this problem by hosting their programs in-house on secure servers, such systems
require the vendor to maintain a significant on-line presence. Maintaining such a presence
may be undesirable (or infeasible) for all software producers.
Obfuscation provides one solution to this dilemma.

An obfuscated program is by

definition protected against reverse-engineering: the program still “works” on arbitrary
inputs, but its code is undecipherable (to anyone who does not hold the secret key). This
implies that an obfuscated program is a “virtual black-box:” the program is functional, but
its “inner workings” are disguised from view.
As a concrete example, consider the following scenario: Alice, a software vendor, wishes
to sell Bob the ability to run some proprietary software without revealing the program’s
source code. Alice could simply run the program on Bob’s behalf, but Alice would prefer
not to remain constantly available to service Bob’s requests. Instead, she would like to sell
Bob an obfuscated version of her software, and then go off-line. The security of obfuscation
implies that Bob would learn no more from this obfuscated program than he could have
learned in the trivial scenario in which Alice simply runs the program on his behalf.
Unfortunately, this type of static obfuscation is impossible for arbitrary programs [BGI+ 01].
Even for very simple programs, the known positive results for obfuscation require significant
security compromises.
As an alternative to static obfuscation, we propose a new relaxed notion of obfuscation
called mediated obfuscation (MO). To achieve fully secure obfuscation of arbitrary
programs, mediated obfuscation uses a minimal amount of interaction with a semi-trusted
third party. Thus, instead of evaluating a static program locally, the user is required
to engage in a 2-party interactive protocol to evaluate an obfuscated program on a
given input. Furthermore, we exclude the trivial solution in which Alice evaluates the
program completely on Bob’s behalf (which can hardly be considered an “obfuscation”).
To accomplish this, our model introduces a third party called the mediator. Alice can
1

E.g., to determine the program’s purpose and/or algorithmic complexity.
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obfuscate her program, send it to Bob, and then outsource the requirement of constant, ondemand availability to the mediator. That is, Bob interacts with the always-online mediator
whenever he wants to evaluate the program on an input. All this is achieved while still
preventing reverse engineering (in this case, by either Bob or the mediator).

1.1

Our Results

In this thesis, we introduce and define the mediated obfuscation model. Briefly, a mediated
obfuscation is a 3-party protocol with the following syntax: a vendor obfuscates the
program f by generating an obfuscated program for the client and some key information
for the mediator. When the client wants to evaluate f on input x, he engages in a protocol
with the mediator, from which he learns f (x).
We establish two security definitions for MO: a “virtual black-box” simulation-based
definition, and a second, weaker definition in the style of semantic security. We show the
general feasibility of MO based on one-round secure computation and fully homomorphic
encryption, and then demonstrate a simple, efficient MO scheme based on functional
encryption. To extend the MO paradigm to obfuscation of arbitrary functions, we show that
a natural way of composing FE schemes preserves security and results in a more expressive
FE system.
Finally, we use mediated obfuscation to connect worst-case and average-case static
obfuscation. In short, an average-case (static) obfuscation of some component of a suitable
functional encryption scheme yields a worst-case (static) obfuscation for a related class of
functions. We use this connection to demonstrate new impossibility results for average-case
(static) obfuscation.
This thesis is based on joint work conducted with Manoj Prabhakaran and Mike Rosulek
[HPR12].
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Chapter 2

Preliminaries
In this chapter, we present preliminary definitions and notation, including brief overviews
of functional encryption, obfuscation, and the Universally Composable security framework.
Readers who are familiar with these concepts may wish to review the new result on the
composability of FE schemes.

2.1

Basic Definitions

When X is a finite set, the notation x ← X means that x is chosen uniformly at random
from X. We say a function f : N → R is negligible in λ if for every constant c > 0 there
exists an integer n such that f (λ) < λ−c for all λ > n. A probabilistic polynomial time
(PPT) algorithm A has access to a source of randomness and runs in polynomial time; that
is, there exists a polynomial p(·) such that for every input x ∈ {0, 1}∗ , the computation
A(x) terminates within p(|x|) steps. For algorithms A and F and an input string x, we write
AF (x) to denote the output of A when executed on input x with oracle access to F (i.e.,
A has access to a “black box” that can evaluate F in a single computational step). Given a
countable set1 I, a probability ensemble indexed by I is a collection of random variables
{Di | i ∈ I}. We say two probability ensembles D = {Dn | n ∈ N} and D0 = {Dn0 | n ∈ N}
are computationally indistinguishable (written D ≈ D0 ) if no efficient procedure can tell
them apart; i.e., for all PPT algorithms A the quantity


Pr [x ← Dn ; A(x) = 1] − Pr x ← Dn0 ; A(x) = 1 is negligible in n.
1

Typically either the natural numbers N or a polynomial-time computable subset of {0, 1}∗ .
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2.2

Functional Encryption

Functional encryption (FE) forms the basis of this work. FE provides sophisticated and
flexible relations between messages and secret keys: a message m is encrypted to a
ciphertext using the public key pk, and a secret key skk is associated with a parameter
k. Using skk allows the key holder to compute a specific function of k and m from an
encryption of m.
FE encompasses a wide range of encryption primitives like identity-based encryption
[BF01, SW04, YFDL04, Wat05, BW06, ABV+ 11], attribute-based encryption [BSW07,
BSW11a, Wat08, AI09, OT10, LOS+ 10], and predicate encryption [KSW08, BW07]. Functional encryption’s expressive power immediately yields natural applications in database
access control, email services, and multimedia content distribution [GPSW06, BW07,
BH08].

2.2.1

Syntax

A functional encryption scheme Σ is parameterized by a functionality F which describes
the information about the plaintext that can be learned from the ciphertext: the result
of decrypting a ciphertext associated with plaintext m, using a decryption key associated
with value k, is F (m, k). Formally, a functionality is a function F : M × K → {0, 1}∗ ,
where K is the key space and M is the message space.2 A functional encryption scheme
with functionality F is a tuple of PPT algorithms Σ = (Setup, KeyGen, Enc, Dec), with the
following syntax:
(pk, mk) ← Setup(1λ ): given a security parameter, Setup samples a public key and a
master key.
skk ← KeyGen(mk, k): accepts a master key and a parameter k ∈ K, and outputs a
decryption key.
c ← Enc(pk, m): takes the public key and a plaintext m ∈ M, and returns a ciphertext.
y ← Dec(skk , c): accepts a decryption key and a ciphertext, and returns either a string
or an error indicator ⊥.
2

Both the key space and the message space implicitly depend on the security parameter λ. For simplicity of
notation, we treat the security parameter as implicit in this context.
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The correctness requirement is that, for all (pk, mk) ← Setup(1λ ) and all skk ←
KeyGen(mk, k), we have Dec(skk , Enc(pk, m)) = F (m, k) with probability 1 over the
randomness of Enc.
Additionally, we extend the standard definition of FE to include a natural notion of key
verifiability wherein a user can verify the validity of a decryption key corresponding to a
given value.
Definition 2.2.1 (Key verifiability). A functional encryption scheme with key verifiability is
an FE scheme as defined above with an additional CheckKey algorithm:
e x): given a public key, a purported decryption key, and a
b ← CheckKey(pk, sk,
e Enc(pk, m)) = F (m, x) with
parameter x, CheckKey returns 1 if ∀m : Dec(sk,
overwhelming probability over the randomness used in Enc, and 0 otherwise.
Note that ∀x : Pr[CheckKey(pk, KeyGen(mk, x), x) = 1] is overwhelming in λ.

2.2.2

Identity-based encryption

Identity-based encryption (IBE) [Sha85, BF01, Wat05] is a notable special case of functional
encryption with particular relevance to the problem of obfuscation. In IBE, a ciphertext
is “addressed” to an arbitrary nonempty string id (such as an email or IP address), and
plaintext messages are pairs (id, m). In terms of the functionality F , an IBE system uses the
function:
F ((id, m), id0 ) =



m

if id = id0


⊥

otherwise

In other words, the encrypted message Enc(pk, (id, m)) can only be decrypted with the secret
key corresponding to the identity id.
The first IBE schemes explicitly included id “in the clear” as an unencrypted part
of the ciphertext. This partial information is represented in terms of the functionality
F via a special empty key ε.

Using the empty key3 as input to Dec yields all the

information about the plaintext that can be gleaned by simply examining the ciphertext,
thus, Dec(ε, c) = F (ε, (id, m)) = id. This simplified the constructions, but allowed anyone
to determine a message’s intended recipient simply by examining the ciphertext. However,
3

Typically defined as the empty string.
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the development of anonymous identity-based encryption (AIBE) [BW06, Gen06] solved
this problem with ciphertexts that do not reveal the message’s intended receiver.
Predicate encryption (PE) [KSW08, BW07] generalizes the AIBE concept: messages
consist of a “payload” and a set of “attributes,” secret keys are associated with a predicate,
and the payload is revealed if and only if the predicate “accepts” the set of attributes. As
before, a ciphertext in a PE system reveals nothing about the payload or the set of attributes.
Here, the salient point is that an anonymous IBE scheme effectively obfuscates the
functionality F (which tests whether id = id0 ). This can be seen by considering an adversary
who has access to the FE algorithms for F : the security of the FE scheme guarantees that
the adversary cannot learn anything meaningful by examining secret keys and ciphertexts
- at best, it can only execute the Dec algorithm on inputs of its choice (assuming it obtains
secret keys for those inputs).
Notably, the AIBE functionality is analogous to the class of point functions with output
I = {Ix,m | x, m}, where a point function Ix,m is a boolean function that assumes the value
m at exactly one point x:
Ix,m (y) =



m

if x = y


⊥

otherwise

Secure AIBE is thus akin to an obfuscation of the class I of point functions with output,
which are used in practice to perform tasks like password checking.

2.2.3

Security definitions

Security definitions for functional encryption schemes come in two basic flavors: indistinguishabilitybased and simulation-based. Briefly, indistinguishability-based security implies that no
efficient (i.e., PPT) algorithm can distinguish between ciphertexts that encode different
messages, while simulation-based security is defined relative to an “ideal world” where a
perfectly trusted party is used to control access to messages. A real scheme is said to be
“simulation-secure” if no (real) adversary can learn more about the encrypted messages
in the real world than in the ideal one (where by definition no information is leaked
unintentionally). Simulation-based security is stronger but typically harder to achieve.
Here, we present two variants of the indistinguishability-based and simulation-based
security definitions given by Boneh, Sahai, & Waters [BSW11a]. In both cases, we require
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that the ciphertext conceal the entire message m.
Definition 2.2.2 (Selective security). Let Σ be an FE scheme as above. Define the following
interaction:
SelSecExp(Σ, A, β, λ) :
1. Give 1λ to A, who then outputs plaintexts m0 , m1 ∈ M.
2. Compute (pk, mk) ← Setup(1λ ) and c = Enc(pk, mβ ). Give (pk, c) to A.
3. A is given access to an oracle KeyGen(mk, ·), subject to the constraint that
F (m0 , k) = F (m1 , k) for all k queried to the oracle.
4. A outputs a bit, which we define as the output of this interaction.
Define the advantage of the adversary A as:
AdvSel(Σ, A, λ) := Pr [SelSecExp(Σ, A, 1, λ) = 1] − Pr [SelSecExp(Σ, A, 0, λ) = 1]
We say that Σ is Selective-secure if for all PPT A the function AdvSel(Σ, A, λ) is negligible in
λ.
This Selective security definition is the selective relaxation of the definition for FE given
in [BSW11a]. In the case that the FE scheme is a predicate scheme, the values m0 and m1
in the above experiment contain both the “payload” and the “attributes” associated with
the ciphertext. Thus the above experiment combines both the standard notion of security
(payload hiding) as well as the notion of (strongly) attribute-hiding [KSW08].4
Definition 2.2.3 (Sim1 security). Let Σ be an FE scheme as above. Define the following
interactions:
Real(Σ, A, m, λ):
1.
2.
3.
4.

Ideal(Σ, S, m, λ):

(pk, mk) ← Setup(1λ )
c ← Enc(pk, m)
z ← AKeyGen(mk,·) (1λ , pk, c)
output
(z, k1 . . . , kn ),
where
k1 , . . . , kn are the queries made
to the oracle in the previous step.

1. z ← S F (m,·) (1λ )
2. output
(z, k1 . . . , kn ),
where
k1 , . . . , kn are the queries made
to the oracle in the previous step.

We say that Σ is Sim1 -secure if for all PPT A there exists a PPT simulator S such that for all m,
the distribution ensembles {Real(Σ, A, m, λ)}λ and {Ideal(Σ, S, m, λ)}λ are indistinguishable.
4

Weak attribute hiding would correspond to the additional restriction that F (m0 , k) = F (m1 , k) = ⊥, in
this case.
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Furthermore, if for all A, the corresponding S treats A only in a straight-line, black-box
manner, then we say that the scheme is straight-line-Sim1 -secure.
Simulation-based security implies that no PPT adversary can distinguish between
encryptions of two different messages (m0 , m1 ) without an evaluation token for a key k ∈ K
such that F (m0 , k) 6= F (m1 , k).
The simulation-based security definition given in [BSW11a] allows the adversary to
request many ciphertexts, and also learn the value F (m, ε) — the so-called “intentional
leakage” of the ciphertext. Thus, in the case where F (m, ε) = ε (i.e., the functionality is
“attribute hiding”) and the adversary only requests one ciphertext, their definition collapses
to the Sim1 definition here.
Theorem 2.2.4. Let Σ be a Sim1 -secure FE scheme as above. Then, Σ is also Selective-secure.
Proof. We prove the contrapositive. Assume that there exists an adversary A∗ such that
AdvSel(Σ, A∗ , λ) is non-negligible (i.e., Σ is not Selective-secure). Then, it suffices to show
that there exists an adversary A+ that breaks the Sim1 -security of Σ: i.e., ∃A+ ∀S∃m :
Real(Σ, A+ , m, λ) 6≈ Ideal(Σ, S, m, λ). We use A∗ to construct A+ .
Since AdvSel(Σ, A∗ , λ) is non-negligible, there exist messages m0 , m1 such that A∗ can
distinguish with non-negligible probability between Enc(pk, m0 ) and Enc(pk, m1 ) using only
oracle queries k1 . . . kn for which F (m0 , ki ) = F (m1 , ki ). Without loss of generality, assume
A∗ always outputs the same m0 , m1 on a given security parameter.
A minor syntactic modification of A∗ yields the desired A+ : define A+ to be a Turing
machine that participates in the Sim1 security interaction, but uses an internally emulated
copy of A∗ to determine its output. That is, when A+ receives a ciphertext c = Enc(pk, m),
it starts A∗ , discards the plaintexts chosen by A∗ in the first step of the Selective security
experiment, passes (pk, c) to A∗ and outputs the bit and oracle queries generated by A∗ .
Thus, we have Real(Σ, A+ , m0 , λ) 6≈ Real(Σ, A+ , m1 , λ).
However, the restriction that F (m0 , ki ) = F (m1 , ki ) for all oracle queries ki implies that
any S receives the same information regardless of whether its oracle is parameterized with
m0 or m1 . Thus, Ideal(Σ, S, m0 , λ) ≡ Ideal(Σ, S, m1 , λ) for all S.
Combining these equations implies that either Real(Σ, A+ , m0 , λ) 6≈ Ideal(Σ, S, m0 , λ) or
Real(Σ, A+ , m1 , λ) 6≈ Ideal(Σ, S, m1 , λ), which means Σ is not Sim1 -secure.
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2.2.4

Composability of FE schemes

The MO construction in Chapter 4 uses existing FE schemes to construct a mediated
obfuscation of the class of point functions with logarithmic-length5 output.

Towards

obfuscating functions with longer output, we show that a natural way of composing FE
schemes preserves the two security notions defined above and results in a more expressive
FE functionality.
Let ΣA , ΣB be distinct FE schemes for the functionalities FA , FB , respectively, where FA
and FB share the same key space. Then, the “composition” of ΣA and ΣB , which we denote
as ΣA kΣB , is the FE scheme defined as follows:
KeyGen∗ (mk ∗ , k):

Setup∗ (1λ ):

parse mk ∗ as (mkA , mkB )
run skkA ← KeyGenA (mkA , k)
run skkB ← KeyGenB (mkB , k)
output skk∗ := (skkA , skkB )

run (pkA , mkA ) ← SetupA (1λ )
run (pkB , mkB ) ← SetupB (1λ )
output (pk ∗ , mk ∗ ) :=
((pkA , pkB ), (mkA , mkB ))

Enc∗ (pk ∗ , (mA , mB )):

Dec∗ (skk∗ , c∗ ):
parse skk∗ as (skkA , skkB ) and c∗ as (cA , cB )
run yA ← DecA (skkA , cA )
run yB ← DecB (skkB , cB )
output y ∗ := (yA , yB )

parse pk ∗ as (pkA , pkB )
run cA ← EncA (pkA , mA )
run cB ← EncB (pkB , mB )
output c∗ := (cA , cB )

ΣA kΣB then supports the functionality FA kFB , defined by:
(FA kFB )((mA , mB ), k) = FA (mA , k) k FB (mB , k).
Thus, if FA and FB are point functions with single-bit output, then the composed
functionality FA kFB has 2-bit output (i.e., FA , FB → {0, 1} ⇒ FA kFB → {0, 1}2 ).
Theorem 2.2.5. If ΣA , ΣB are Selective-secure (resp. straight-line-Sim1 -secure) FE schemes
for the functionalities FA , FB , respectively, then ΣA kΣB is Selective-secure (resp. straight-lineSim1 -secure) for the functionality FA kFB .
Proof overview. The proofs use a series of hybrid arguments over the adversaries in the
security interactions (Figure 2.1). More generally, if the composed scheme is NOT secure,
then the adversary which breaks the security of ΣA kΣB could be used as a subroutine
5

With respect to the security parameter λ.
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with internally generated inputs to break the security of either ΣA or ΣB , contradicting the
assumption that both ΣA and ΣB are secure. We first prove the security of ΣA kΣB in the
Selective security model:
Proof. In the Selective security model, let A be an adversary that participates in the selective
security experiment for the composed FE scheme ΣA kΣB . For A, SelSecExp runs as follows:
- On input 1λ , A submits two message pairs (mA , mB )0 , (mA , mB )1 .
- Compute (pk ∗ , mk ∗ ) ← Setup∗ (1λ ) and c∗ = Enc(pk ∗ , (mA , mB )β ). Give pk ∗ =
(pkA , pkB ) and c∗ = (cA , cB ) to A.
- A adaptively submits queries to a KeyGen∗ (mk ∗ , ·) oracle, subject to the constraint
that (FA kFB )((mA , mB )0 , k) = (FA kFB )((mA , mB )1 , k) for all k queried to the oracle.
- A outputs a guess b ∈ {0, 1}.
Let SA (resp. SB ) be an adversary that participates in the selective security experiment for
ΣA (resp. ΣB ) by internally emulating A as well as the FE algorithms for ΣB (resp. ΣA )
on arbitrary inputs. Assume that SA (resp. SB ) outputs the same bit b as its emulated copy
of A. On input pkA , SA honestly generates pkB and sends pk ∗ = (pkA , pkB ) to A. A issues
its KeyGen∗ queries for k1 , k2 , . . . , and receives responses skk∗ = (skkA , skkB ) where skkB is
generated internally by SA according to KeyGenB and skkA is generated by sending k to an
external KeyGenA oracle. Then, A generates two messages (mA , mB )0 , (mA , mB )1 for the
composed functionality FA kFB . Since no key query (FA kFB )(·, ki ) distinguishes between
(mA , mB )0 and (mA , mB )1 , we can say that FA (·, k) (resp. FB (·, k)) doesn’t distinguish
between the messages (mA )0 and (mA )1 (resp. (mB )0 and (mB )1 ). Thus, (mA )0 and
(mA )1 are passed to the (external) challenger in the indistinguishability game for ΣA , which
responds by sending SA an encryption Enc(pkA , (mA )β ).
By the construction of SA , Pr [SelSecExp(ΣA , SA , 0, λ) = 1] ≡ Pr [SelSecExp(ΣA kΣB , A, 0, λ) = 1],
and by the security of ΣA , Pr [SelSecExp(ΣA , SA , 0, λ) = 1] ≈ Pr [SelSecExp(ΣA , SA , 1, λ) = 1].
Now consider the adversary SB that participates in the indistinguishability game for ΣB .
Since both SA and SB work by internally emulating A, and by construction the view of A
(i.e., its inputs and outputs) in SA is distributed identically to the view of A in SB , we can
say that Pr [SelSecExp(ΣA , SA , 1, λ) = 1] ≡ Pr [SelSecExp(ΣB , SB , 0, λ) = 1].
By the construction of SB (similar to the argument above), we also have
Pr [SelSecExp(ΣB , SB , 1, λ) = 1] ≡ Pr [SelSecExp(ΣA kΣB , A, 1, λ) = 1], and the security of
ΣB implies that Pr [SelSecExp(ΣB , SB , 1, λ) = 1] ≈ Pr [SelSecExp(ΣB , SB , 0, λ) = 1]. Thus,
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by transitivity we have
Pr [SelSecExp(ΣA kΣB , A, 0, λ) = 1] ≈ Pr [SelSecExp(ΣA kΣB , A, 1, λ) = 1]
which implies that ΣA kΣB is Selective-secure.
Next, we prove Theorem 2.2.5 for Sim1 -secure FE schemes:
Proof. Let ΣA , ΣB be Sim1 -secure FE schemes for the functionalities FA , FB respectively.
Consider the adversary AKeyGen

∗

(mk∗ ,·)

which attacks the composed scheme ΣA kΣB . On

input c∗ = Enc∗ (pk ∗ , (mA , mB )), A submits queries to a KeyGen∗ oracle and eventually
outputs a bit. Since KeyGen∗ operates by individually running the KeyGen algorithms from
KeyGenA (mkA ,·)

ΣA and ΣB , we can use A to construct an adversary AA
AKeyGen

∗

(mk∗ ,·)

that internally emulates

along with all algorithms and inputs for ΣB , and outputs the same bit as A.
KeyGenA (mkA ,·)

Since ΣA is black-box Sim1 -secure, we can then say that AA
some SA that internally emulates

KeyGenA (mkA ,·)
AA

F (mA ,·)

≈ SAA

for

as a straight-line subroutine, given that

AA and SA issue the same oracle queries as the emulated subroutine for A.
Recall that AA internally generates inputs to ΣB . Using this fact, we can construct an
KeyGenB (mkB ,·)

adversary AB

whose output is identically distributed to SA , but who receives

EncB (pkB , mB ) externally and queries an external KeyGenB oracle instead of generating
F (mA ,·)

these inputs internally. This construction implies SAA

KeyGenB (mkB ,·)

≡ AB

.

Invoking the straight-line, black-box Sim1 -security of ΣB then yields a simulator SB that
F (mA ,·)

internally emulates SAA

KeyGenB (mkB ,·)

as a subroutine, such that AB

F (mB ,·)

≈ SBB

when

AB and SB issue the same oracle queries as A. Finally, recall that the original (emulated)
adversary A runs as a subroutine within SB , and every KeyGen∗ query made by A on
input k is answered by an emulated oracle for FA (mA , k) as well as an external oracle
for FB (mB , k). This combination of two separate oracles for FA and FB operating on the
same input k can then be replaced with one query to an oracle for (FA kFB )((mA , mB ), ·),
F (mB ,·)

which means we can construct S (FA kFB )((mA ,mB ),·) ≡ SBB
∗

AKeyGen ≈ S (FA kFB )((mA ,mB ),·)
which implies that ΣA kΣB is Sim1 -secure.
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. Then, by transitivity

ΣA

KeyGenA

ΣB

KeyGenB

≡

ΣA

KeyGenA

ΣB

KeyGenB

A

≈

A
AA

z

z

FA (mA , ·)

ΣB

ΣB

KeyGenB

KeyGenB

FA (mA , ·)

≡

A

≈

A
SA

AB

z

z

FB (mB , ·)

FA (mA , ·) k FB (mB , ·)

FA (mA , ·)

≡

A

A
SB

S
z

z

Figure 2.1: Steps in the proof of the composition theorem for straight-line-Sim1 -security.
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2.3

Obfuscation

A program f is obfuscated if it cannot be “reverse-engineered” — that is, the source code
of f reveals no more information than can be learned from oracle access to f . Obfuscation
has a wide range of applications, most obviously in the realm of software protection.
Definition 2.3.1. An algorithm Of is an obfuscation of the function (Turing machine) f if for
all probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) adversaries A there exists an oracle PPT simulator S
such that the quantity
h
i
Pr [A(Of ) = 1] − Pr S f (1|f | ) = 1 is a negligible function of |f |.
Essentially, Definition 2.3.1 implies that nothing meaningful can be learned by examining the description of an obfuscated program: at best, an obfuscated program Of is
indistinguishable from an idealized, inviolable “oracle” that does nothing but accept inputs
x and return f (x).
The study of program obfuscation in the context of provable security was initiated by
Barak et al. [BGI+ 01], where it was famously shown that general-purpose obfuscation
is impossible, even for relatively weak definitions of (static) obfuscation. This result is
achieved by constructing a class of Turing machines (TM) for functions that can neither be
obfuscated nor deduced via oracle queries alone. The unobfuscatable TM from [BGI+ 01] is
defined in terms of its two “subroutine” Turing machines summarized here:
First, for strings x, m ∈ {0, 1}k define the TM that computes a point function with output

Ix,m (y) :=



m

if x = y


0k

otherwise

Then define a Turing machine J that when given the description of a Turing machine
hKi determines whether K computes the same function6 as Ix,m or whether K computes
Ix0 ,m0 for any (x0 , m0 ) 6= (x, m)
6

As presented, J is uncomputable. However, it suffices for J to consider whether K = Ix,m in a polynomial
number of steps.
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Jx,m (hKi) :=



1

if K(x) = m


0

otherwise

Now consider an adversary A that is given obfuscations OIx,m , OJx,m of the functions
Ix,m and Jx,m . A can simply run OJx,m on input hOIx,m i, and the correctness property of
obfuscation implies that the result of OJx,m (hOIx,m i) = 1, that is


Pr A(OJx,m , OIx,m ) = 1 = 1
Since Ix,m returns a non-zero value on only one point, and Jx,m is non-zero on negligibly
few points in the space of all Turing machines, any polynomial-time algorithm S with oracle
access to Ix,m , Jx,m has a negligibly small probability of querying either oracle on an input
where the value of the function is not zero. Thus, even with the additional information
yielded by oracle access to the function Ix,m , it is highly unlikely that any simulator will be
able to generate a TM description hM i such that Jx,m (hM i) = 1. Formally:
h

∀S : Pr hM i ← S

Ix,m ,Jx,m

i
(1 ) : Jx,m (hM i) = 1 is negligible.
k

Thus, the “virtual black-box” notion of obfuscation from Definition 2.3.1 is impossible for
arbitrary functions. This construction formalizes the intuitive notion that access to the
source code of a program is a significant advantage to algorithms that operate in polynomial
time.
Positive results for obfuscations have mostly been limited to point functions [LPS04,
Wee05, CD08], yet even point functions require some necessary relaxations of the original
definitions (cf. [Wee05]). Hofheinz et al. [HMLS10] proposed a very natural relaxation
of the security definitions of [BGI+ 01]; namely, they considered obfuscating functions
which are drawn at random from a class (average-case obfuscation). By comparison,
the previous definition required security to hold equally for every function in the class
(worst-case obfuscation). Average-case obfuscation is a natural choice when obfuscating
a cryptographic primitive, where the obfuscation needs only to hide the hard-coded secret
key that was sampled honestly.7 Several expressive cryptographic primitives have features
7

The model proposed by Hofheinz et al. also considers the problem of obfuscating randomized functions.
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that can be understood as being average-case obfuscations of certain functionalities: e.g.,
proxy-re-encryption [HRsV11] and encrypted signatures [Had10].
Our definitions for mediated obfuscation require that client and mediator engage in
a one-round protocol in order for the client to evaluate the obfuscated program.

In

our main feasibility result, we use existing constructions for one-round secure computation [CCKM00, IKO+ 11], as well as other highly powerful cryptographic tools like fully
homomorphic [Gen09] and targeted non-malleable [BSW11b] encryption schemes which
naturally lend themselves to one-round protocols.

2.4

Universally Composable Security

The Universally Composable (UC) framework is a system for establishing and analyzing
the security of cryptographic protocols [Can00]. In this work, the UC framework is used
to demonstrate the general feasibility of mediated obfuscation schemes based on secure
1-round protocols for non-interactive computation.
Interactive Turing machines (ITMs) form the basis of the UC framework’s computational
model. Interactive Turing machines are Turing machines with a special “shared tape” which
can be read and modified (written into) by other ITMs [GMR89]. In the UC framework, the
execution of a protocol in an arbitrary network environment is modeled with a system of
ITMs that are appropriately connected via their shared tapes.
The main entities in the UC model are outlined below:
Functionalities (F) represent desirable cryptographic tasks; in the UC model, a
functionality is a trusted entity that receives (possibly empty) inputs from
parties P0 , P1 , . . . , Pn , performs some computational task on those inputs, and
returns appropriate outputs to the parties.
Protocols (π, ρ, φ, . . . ) define methods for interacting with functionalities. Generally, an honest party is a uniquely-identified ITM interacting with a functionality
F by running the code of protocol π; corrupt parties interact with F but run
arbitrary code.
Environments (Z) model all network activity external to the parties executing π (or
otherwise interacting with F). The environment interacts with all parties and
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the adversary, and outputs a single bit on the completion of protocol execution.
Adversaries (A, S) attempt to extract secret information from the honest parties
or otherwise manipulate protocol execution by corrupting one or more honest
parties. “Corruption” of an honest party is modeled by allowing the adversary
total control over the corrupt party’s interaction with the functionality. The
adversary also communicates with the environment.
The UC framework uses the trusted third-party paradigm to establish the security of
cryptographic protocols. For any given cryptographic task, an ideal functionality F is defined
which represents a set of instructions that tell a trusted party how to carry out that task. As
with the other entities in the UC framework, the ideal functionality is modeled as an ITM.
Interactions with ideal functionalities are carried out according to an ideal protocol via
a set of dummy parties {P˜0 , P˜1 , . . . , P˜n }. Dummy parties simply relay messages between the
ideal functionality and the other entities in the UC model.. The ideal protocol, denoted
IDEALF ,

represents an incorruptible means to achieve a task F and is necessarily impossible

to realize in the real world.
Security guarantees in the UC framework are established relative to the ideal protocol.
A real-world cryptographic protocol π is said to securely realize an ideal functionality F if
the protocol can be mathematically shown to emulate the ideal protocol IDEALF .
Security proofs in the UC framework are derived by considering a model that captures
both the influence of the adversary on protocol execution and the impact of protocol
execution on the environment. This model consists of a network of ITMs representing
the protocol π, the adversary A, and the environment Z. Proofs in this model typically
yield statements like, “protocol π emulates protocol ρ,” or “protocol π securely realizes
functionality F because it emulates IDEALF .”
Protocol emulation is established by considering the interaction between the protocol
and the adversary from the point of view of the environment. Informally, a protocol π is said
to emulate another protocol ρ if, for any given environment Z, it is possible to construct
a simulator S such that interactions between π and the adversary A “look the same” as
interactions between ρ and the simulator S.
More formally, let EXEC[π, A, Z] be the random variable representing the environment
Z’s output after adversary A interacts with protocol π. Then, protocol π emulates protocol
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ρ if:
∀A∃S∀Z : EXEC[Z, A, π] ≈ EXEC[Z, S, ρ]
where ≈ denotes computational indistinguishability. If ρ is the ideal protocol IDEALF , then
π is said to UC-realize functionality F.
Furthermore, the UC framework can be extended to admit secure protocols for
essentially all computable functions by assuming a priori access to an appropriate set-up
functionality. The UC framework augmented with black-box access to a functionality G is
called the G-hybrid model.
The most extensively studied set-up assumption is the common reference string functionality FCRS (Figure 2.2) [CF01], which is parameterized by a distribution D and set
of parties P participating in a protocol instance. The FCRS -hybrid model assumes that all
protocol instances have access to a unique trusted party that can provide, upon request, a
common string chosen uniformly at random from the uniform distribution over strings of
some length.
• On input REQUEST from party P : verify that party P is a participant in the
protocol instance. If P ∈
/ P, abort.
• If there is no random string r already recorded, choose and record r ← D.
• Send public output r to P .
Figure 2.2: The common reference string functionality FCRS for a distribution D and a set
of parties P.
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Chapter 3

Mediated Obfuscation
In this chapter, we present the mediated obfuscation (MO) model, security definitions,
and general feasibility based on non-malleable secret sharing and fully homomorphic
encryption. Mediated obfuscation is a natural relaxation of static obfuscation that employs
a limited amount of interaction to securely evaluate a function.

3.1

Model

In the mediated obfuscation (MO) model (Figure 3.1), a vendor wants to provide a client
with the ability to evaluate a function f without revealing f and without remaining online
for the client’s convenience. To accomplish this, the vendor employs a trusted mediator to
interact with the client.

vendor

Of

mkf

x
client

mediator
skx
hC, M i

Figure 3.1: The mediated obfuscation model.
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The security requirements are modeled via an ideal functionality FMO (Figure 3.2),
parameterized by a class of functions C. For simplicity, the roles of the three parties are
fixed in the description of FMO . In an interaction with FMO , the client has only oracle access
to the function f . The mediator simply guards this access, possibly based on the inputs
being sent.
• On input f from the vendor, where f ∈ C: if any value f 0 is previously
recorded, then abort. Otherwise, internally record f and send OK to the
client and mediator. If both the client and mediator are corrupt, also send f
to both parties.
• On input x from the client, abort if no value f was previously recorded.
Otherwise, send the value INPUT to the mediator and internally record x.
• On input OK from the mediator, abort if no value f was previously recorded,
or if no value x was previously recorded. Otherwise, compute y = f (x) and
give output y to the client and output OK to the mediator.
Figure 3.2: The FMO functionality for mediated obfuscation of a class of functions C.

3.2

Syntax

The functionality FMO , along with the following syntactic constraints, defines the syntax of
MO:
Definition 3.2.1. A mediated obfuscation (MO) scheme ∆ = (Obfu, hC, M i) for the class
of functions C is a protocol for the FMO functionality described in Figure 3.2, where Obfu is the
vendor’s protocol function and hC, M i is a 1-round, 2-party interactive protocol between the
client and mediator. The function Obfu is defined as follows:
• (Of , mkf ) ← Obfu(1λ , f ): accepts a security parameter and a description of a function
(or circuit) f ∈ C, and outputs an obfuscated version of the function along with a master
key for the function.
• The vendor sends Of to the client and mkf to the mediator.
Once Of and mkf are distributed, the vendor’s role in the protocol is finished: all further
interaction takes place between the client and the mediator. When the client wants to evaluate f
on input x, she engages in the 2-party protocol hC, M i with the mediator. The joint execution of
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the client, holding inputs Of , x, and the mediator, holding input mkf , results in an output f (x)
for the client assuming mkf is a valid key for f . We write this as f (x) ← hC[Of , x], M [mkf ]i.
We require that hC, M i is 1-round (send and receive one message) and stateless across different
values of x.

3.3

Security Definitions

Next, we define the security conditions for MO. These definitions capture the intuitive
notion that the client shouldn’t learn anything more than she would with oracle access
to the function f .
Definition 3.3.1. We define the following levels of security for an MO scheme:
1. Full security: The MO scheme is a secure protocol for the FMO functionality (Figure 3.2).
2. Relaxed security: The MO scheme is a secure protocol for the FMOX functionality
(Figure 3.3) which gives x to the mediator.
• On input f from the vendor, where f ∈ C: if any value f 0 is previously
recorded, then abort. Otherwise, internally record f and send OK to the
client and mediator. If both the client and mediator are corrupt, also send f
to both parties.
• On input x from the client, abort if no value f was previously recorded.
Otherwise, send INPUT and x to the mediator and internally record x.
• On input OK from the mediator, abort if no value f was previously recorded,
or if no value x was previously recorded. Otherwise, compute y = f (x) and
give output y to the client and output OK to the mediator.
Figure 3.3: The FMOX functionality for mediated obfuscation of a class of functions C.
3. Semantic security: Let ∆ denote the MO scheme, and define the following interaction:
MOSSExp(∆, A, β, λ) :
(a) Give 1λ to A, who then outputs (descriptions of) two functions
f0 , f1 ∈ C.
(b) Compute (Ofβ , mkβ ) ← Obfu(fβ , 1λ ). Give (1λ , Ofβ ) to A.
(c) A is allowed to repeatedly engage in the protocol with an honest party
running M [mkfβ ]. If M ever aborts, or outputs x such that f0 (x) 6= f1 (x),
the entire interaction halts.
(d) A outputs a bit, which we define as the output of this interaction.
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Define the advantage of the adversary A as:

MOSSAdv(∆, A, λ) :=

Pr [MOSSExp(∆, A, 1, λ) = 1]
− Pr [MOSSExp(∆, A, 0, λ) = 1]

Then ∆ is semantically secure if relaxed security holds when the security condition
against a corrupt client is replaced with the following condition: for all PPT A the
function MOSSAdv(∆, A, λ) is negligible in λ.
We point out that for certain classes of functions (e.g., collision-resistant hash functions),
this definition of semantic security is somewhat vacuous since it may be computationally
infeasible for the adversary to find two functions f0 6= f1 and an input x which satisfy
the requirement that f0 (x) = f1 (x). An analogous drawback to semantic-security-style
definitions for functional encryption was observed by O’Neill [O’N10].

3.4

General Feasibility

We outline two constructions of mediated obfuscation schemes that achieve full security
and support obfuscation of arbitrary functions. However, these constructions make use of
encryption primitives that are both powerful and inefficient, leaving room for the simpler
construction based on functional encryption presented in Chapter 4.

3.4.1

Using one-round secure computation

A non-malleable secret sharing (NMSS) scheme [IPS08] consists of two algorithms, Split
and Join. We require that if (α, β) ← Split(x), then the marginal distributions of α and β
are each independent of x, but that Join(α, β) = x. The non-malleability property of the
scheme is that, for all x and PPT adversaries A:
h
i
Pr (α, β) ← Split(x); β 0 ← A(β, x) : β 0 6= β ∧ Join(α, β 0 ) 6= ⊥ is negligible.
Using NMSS as a building block, the MO construction is as follows:
Obfu(f, 1λ ):
1. Sample r ← {0, 1}λ and send r to both the client and mediator.
2. Generate (α, β) ← Split(hf i). Set Of := α and mkf := β.
22

3. Send α to the client and β to the mediator.
hC, M i protocol (client has input (Of , x); mediator has input mkf ):
1. Run a one-round, two-party protocol for the FJOIN functionality (Figure 3.4).
• On input (Of , x) from the client, record (Of , x) and send the value INPUT to
the mediator.
• On input mkf from the mediator, record mkf . Abort if no value (Of , x) was
previously recorded.
• Set f := Join(Of , mkf ); if f = ⊥, then abort.
• Give f (x) to the client.
• Erase all previously recorded values.
Figure 3.4: The FJOIN functionality for the hC, M i subprotocol using NMSS.
Several works show how the hC, M i protocol can be carried out in a single round of
interaction [CCKM00, IKO+ 11]. In particular, Ishai et al. [IKO+ 11] give UC-secure, 1-round
protocols in the FCRS -hybrid model (Figure 2.2). In our setting, the vendor can honestly
sample and provide a common reference string to both parties, eliminating the need for
trusted setup.
Theorem 3.4.1. The NMSS-MO construction above is a fully-secure MO scheme for the class
of functions whose description length is bounded by λ.
Proof. In this construction, we can apply the UC security of the two-party subprotocol, so
that the MO protocol is operating in a hybrid model providing ideal access to the FJOIN
functionality defined in Figure 3.4. We first consider security against a corrupt client. The
simulator in the FMO -hybrid model is as follows: First, the simulator chooses a random
α and gives it to the client. By the secret sharing property of the NMSS, the simulated
α is distributed identically to the real interaction. When the client gives (α0 , x) to the
?

hybrid functionality, the simulator checks whether α = α0 . If not, then the simulator
aborts; otherwise, the simulator sends x to FMO . By the non-malleability property of the
NMSS scheme, we have that an honest mediator would have aborted with overwhelming
probability if α 6= α0 , so the simulation is sound.
Next, we consider security against a corrupt mediator. The simulation is extremely
similar to the previous case. The simulator provides a random β. When the mediator sends
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β to the hybrid functionality, the simulator sends OK to FMO . By similar reasoning to above,
this simulation is sound.

3.4.2

Using (derivatives of) fully-homomorphic encryption

A targeted-malleable homomorphic encryption scheme [BSW11b] supports a limited set
of homomorphic ciphertext operations as features; all others ways of generating related
ciphertexts are infeasible.
Definition 3.4.2 (Targeted-malleability). Let Π = (KeyGen, Enc, Dec) be a public-key
encryption scheme. Define the following interactions:
Real(Π, A, λ):

Ideal(Π, S, λ):

(pk, sk) ← KeyGen(1λ )
(M, STATE1 , STATE2 ) ← A1 (pk, 1λ )
(m1 , . . . , mr ) ← M
c∗i ← Enc(pk, mi ) for all i ∈ {1, . . . , r}
(c1 , . . . , cq ) ← A2 (c∗1 , . . . , c∗r , STATE2 , 1λ )
For every j ∈ {1, . . . , q} let
(
COPY i
if cj = c∗i
dj :=
Decsk (cj ) otherwise
7. Output (STATE1 , m1 , . . . , mr , d1 , . . . , dq )

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

(pk, sk) ← KeyGen(1λ )
(M, STATE1 , STATE2 ) ← S1 (pk, 1λ )
(m1 , . . . , mr ) ← M
(c1 , . . . , cq ) ← S2 (STATE2 , 1λ )
For every
 j ∈ {1, . . . , q} let
COPYi
if cj = COPYi





if cj = (i, f1 , . . . , fl )



where i ∈ {1, . . . , r},
dj := f (mi )

l ≤ t, f1 , . . . , fl ∈ F,




and f = f1 ◦ · · · ◦ fl



Dec (c ) otherwise
sk j
6. Output (STATE1 , m1 , . . . , mr , d1 , . . . , dq ).
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

We say that Π is non-malleable against chosen-plaintext attacks with respect to a class of
functions F if for all PPT A = (A1 , A2 ) there exists a PPT simulator S = (S1 , S2 ) such that
the distribution ensembles {Real(Π, A, λ)}λ and {Ideal(Π, S, λ)}λ are indistinguishable.
Let E(hCi, x) := C(x) denote a universal circuit. Let (KeyGen, Enc, Dec) be a targetedmalleable encryption scheme supporting homomorphic operations Enc(y) 7→ Enc(E(y, x) ⊕
s) for all x, s. Then the MO construction is as follows:
Obfu(f, 1λ ):
1. Generate (pk, sk) ← KeyGen(1λ ), and set c = Enc(pk, hf i).
2. Set Of := (pk, c) and mkf := sk.
hC, M i protocol (client has input (Of , x); mediator has input mkf ):
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1. The client chooses random string s and uses the homomorphic properties
of the scheme to obtain c0 = Enc(E(hf i, x)⊕s). He sends c0 to the mediator.
2. The mediator decrypts c0 and sends the result to the client. The client strips
s and obtains f (x) as the result.
Theorem 3.4.3. A targeted-malleable homomorphic encryption scheme can be used to
construct a relaxed-secure MO scheme for the class of functions whose description length is
bounded by λ.
Proof. We first consider security against a corrupt client. The simulator provides the client
with an honestly generated key pk and a ciphertext c ← Enc(pk, 0λ ). The definition
of targeted non-malleability implies that there is a simulator which can “extract” the
homomorphic operation applied to a ciphertext. Thus when the client provides a ciphertext
c0 , our simulator extracts the parameters x and s identifying the valid homomorphic
operation that was applied to c. If this extraction is successful, the simulator sends x to
FMOX . Upon receiving y = f (x) from FMOX , the simulator hands the client an encryption
Enc(pk, y ⊕ s), where s was the value extracted previously.
For security against a semi-honest mediator, we simply observe that by the homomorphic
properties of the scheme, and the random choice of mask s chosen by the client, the
mediator sees only a random-looking encryption of a random value in each interaction
of the protocol.
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Chapter 4

Functional Encryption as Mediated
Obfuscation
In this chapter, we demonstrate that secure mediated obfuscations can be constructed from
existing functional encryption systems. First, we present a purely generic MO construction
based on functional encryption syntax. Then, we show that the Okamoto-Takashima IBE
scheme described in the full version of [OT10, §G.3] actually satisfies Sim1 -security for AIBE,
provided that the message space is polynomial in size. Thus, this scheme yields a mediated
obfuscation for the class of point functions with logarithmic-length output, which can be
concatenated via Theorem 2.2.5 to provide mediated obfuscations of arbitrary functions.

4.1

Generic Construction from Functional Encryption

Given a functional encryption scheme Σ = (Setup, KeyGen, Enc, Dec) for the functionality
F (m, k), a mediated obfuscation scheme ∆ = (Obfu, hM, Ci) for the class of functions
C = {F (m, ·) | m} can be naturally constructed as follows:
Obfu(f, 1λ ):
1. Run (pk, mk) ← Setup(1λ ) and c ← Enc(pk, m), where m is such that f (·) ≡
F (m, ·).
2. Set Of := c and mkf := mk. Output (Of , mkf ).
hC, M i protocol (client has input (Of , x); mediator has input mkf ):
1. The client sends x to the mediator.
2. The mediator runs skx ← KeyGen(mk, x) and sends skx to the client.
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3. The client runs CheckKey(pk, skx , x), and aborts if CheckKey returns 0.
4. The client computes and outputs y ← Dec(skx , Of ). The FE correctness
properties ensure that y = F (m, x).
Theorem 4.1.1. If Σ is a Sim1 -secure (resp. Selective-secure) FE scheme with verifiable keys for
functionality F , then the above construction ∆ is a relaxed-secure (resp. semantically-secure)
MO scheme for class of functions C = {F (m, ·) | m}.
Proof overview. Correctness of our construction follows from the correctness properties of
the FE scheme. Security against a corrupt (semi-honest) mediator follows from the fact that
such a mediator’s view consists only of mkf and the queries x1 , . . . , xk of the client. mkf is
distributed independently of m (the index of F (m, ·) ∈ C), and the client’s queries are also
available to the mediator in the ideal interaction with FMOX .
Proof. For security against a corrupt (malicious) client, we first consider the case where Σ
is Sim1 -secure. The client receives a ciphertext c ← Enc(pk, m) and then, via the hC, M i
protocol, effectively uses the mediator as an oracle for KeyGen(mk, ·). Thus the client is
a valid adversary in the Sim1 security experiment1 for Σ. There exists a simulator S that
simulates the view of the client, given only black-box access to F (m, ·). This simulation can
thus be carried out in the FMOX -ideal model, since FMOX provides the simulator access to
a (guarded) oracle for F (m, ·). This establishes full security for the MO scheme against a
corrupt client.
Similarly, in the semantic security game for MO against a corrupt client, the client first
specifies two functions f0 , f1 ∈ C and then receives an obfuscation of fβ . The client is
further allowed to repeatedly interact with an honest mediator subject to the constraint
that the mediator reports an input x for the client such that f0 (x) = f1 (x). As the mediator
is simply acting as an oracle to KeyGen(mkf , ·), it can easily be seen that the MO semantic
security game can be carried out within the FE Selective-security game in a straight-forward
manner.

4.1.1

On full vs. relaxed security

The above construction achieves relaxed MO security (meaning that the mediator learns x).
In some settings involving software rental/leasing, it is in fact desirable for the mediator
1

The Sim1 game also gives pk to the adversary, but it is not needed for our MO construction.
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to obtain the client’s inputs for accounting or policy-enforcement purposes. However,
if leakage of x is undesirable, then a straight-forward transformation can convert this
construction to full MO security (in which the mediator may be malicious but does not
learn x) as follows:
First, the vendor generates a sufficiently long random string s and gives it to both
the client and mediator. Then the client and mediator can treat s as a common random
string and run a UC-secure subprotocol for evaluating the KeyGen function (with the client
providing x and the mediator providing mk, and only the client receiving output). As above,
this can be done in a single round of interaction [IKO+ 11]. By the UC-security of the
subprotocol, whatever the client can learn in this modified protocol can be learned with
access to a KeyGen(mk, ·) oracle, as the mediator provides in the simpler protocol above.
If the FE scheme satisfies the notion of key verifiability given in Definition 2.2.1, then this
transformation achieves full MO security.
Remark 4.1.2. Without loss of generality, we can assume in the MO scheme that the same
query is not given twice to KeyGen. This can be enforced by letting the mediator keep track of
queries, or by having the mediator evaluate a version of KeyGen that has been derandomized
with a pseudorandom function.

4.2

Implementing Mediated Obfuscation

The generic construction presented in Section 4.1 suggests that implementing MO with
existing FE schemes should be relatively straightforward. We outline the requirements
for meeting the security definitions given in Section 2.2.3, and then demonstrate that the
AIBE instantiation of the general scheme from [OT10] satisfies key-verifiability and the
definitions of both semantic security and strong simulation-based security.

4.2.1

Achieving semantic security

Modern FE schemes have focused on predicate encryption. That is, a “payload” encrypted
with parameter y can be decrypted by the key corresponding to parameter x only if
P (x, y) = 1. Our application requires a notion of “attribute-hiding” — namely, that the
ciphertext hides parameter y in addition to the payload. The current state of the art for
such predicate encryption schemes is for inner-product predicates; using the notation above,
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?

these schemes use the predicate P (x, y) = [hx, yi = 0], where x and y are interpreted as
vectors.
To achieve semantic-security for our MO scheme instantiation, we require only a
Selective-secure (but attribute-hiding) FE scheme. Katz, Sahai, and Waters constructed
such a Selective-secure inner-product predicate encryption scheme [KSW08]. Okamoto &
Takashima [OT11] have recently published a fully-secure, attribute-hiding scheme as well.2
Predicate-encryption schemes encrypt a ciphertext with a fixed payload m, and the
decryption is all-or-nothing, resulting in either m or an error ⊥. Thus, these schemes can
be used to obfuscate a function with a single bit of output (using a public, fixed m and
interpreting m as 1, ⊥ as 0). Then multiple FE schemes can be combined/concatenated (as
outlined in Section 2.2.4) to obfuscate a function with longer output. Thus, to obfuscate a
function f in our model, it suffices to obfuscate f1 , . . . , fk , where fi is the function which
gives the i-th bit of f ’s output.
Furthermore, we note that polynomial evaluation (“does p(x) = 0?”), CNF, and DNF
formulas can all be expressed using inner products [KSW08]. Thus a very wide class of
functions can be obfuscated in our model with semantic security.
Theorem 4.2.1. A secure attribute-hiding predicate encryption scheme Σ which implements
?

the predicate P (x, y) := [hx, yi = 0] can be used to evaluate CNF/DNF formulæ.
Proof overview. Polynomials can be evaluated using inner-product relations, and CNF and
DNF formulæ can be written as multivariate polynomials. We demonstrate that such an
encoding reveals no information about the Boolean expression to be evaluated (though
keys do reveal the values tested in the logical formula).
Proof. To evaluate a polynomial in m variables with total degree n, first order the

n+m
n



terms lexicographically (shown here with m = 2, ordered by variable and then exponent):
p(x, y) = a1 xn y 0 +a2 xn−1 y 1 +a3 xn−1 y 0 +a4 xn−2 y 2 +a5 xn−2 y 1 +a6 xn−2 y 0 +· · ·+a(n+2) x0 y 0
n

Associating the vector of coefficients ~a := (a1 , a2 , . . . ) with a ciphertext and specific variable
assignments ~v := (xn y 0 , xn−1 y 1 , . . . , x0 y 0 ) with a message, we see that h~a, ~v i = p(x, y).
2

Lewko et al. [LOS+ 10] construct a scheme that is fully (not selectively) secure but which satisfies only a
weaker notion of attribute-hiding. It is not discussed whether the scheme satisfies selective attribute-hiding.
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To encode logical expressions, we proceed recursively: for the base case, we construct a
simple single-variable polynomial to test equality:
P

?

x=I

(x) := x − I

Then, define the AND and OR operators in terms of logical expressions φ encoded as
polynomials Pφ :
Pφ1 ∨φ2 (~x1 , ~x2 ) := Pφ1 (~x1 ) · Pφ2 (~x2 )
Pφ1 ∧φ2 (~x1 , ~x2 ) := r · Pφ1 (~x1 ) + Pφ2 (~x2 )
for random r ∈ Zq . The proofs that x − I = 0 ⇐⇒ x = I and x1 · x2 = 0 ⇐⇒ (x1 =
0) ∨ (x2 = 0) are straightforward, and with all but negligible probability over choice of r it
holds that r · x1 + x2 = 0 ⇐⇒ (x1 = 0) ∧ (x2 = 0). Thus, for all φ, Pφ = 0 if and only if φ
evaluates to TRUE.
To build an appropriate polynomial for an arbitrary logical expression, e.g.
φ=


 

(x1 = I1 ) ∨ (x2 = I2 ) ∧ (x3 = I3 ) ∨ (x4 = I4 )

we begin with the polynomials encoding the equality tests Pφ1 = x1 − I1 , Pφ2 = x2 − I2 ,
Pφ3 = x3 − I3 , and Pφ4 = x4 − I4 . Combining these via the definitions of Pφ1 ∧φ2 and Pφ1 ∨φ2
above yields:
Pφ5 = Pφ1 ∨φ2 (x1 , x2 ) = Pφ1 (x1 ) · Pφ2 (x2 )
Pφ6 = Pφ3 ∨φ4 (x3 , x4 ) = Pφ3 (x3 ) · Pφ4 (x4 )



Pφ = Pφ5 ∧φ6 (x1 , x2 ), (x3 , x4 ) = r · Pφ5 (x1 , x2 ) + Pφ6 (x3 , x4 )

 

= r · (x1 − I1 ) · (x2 − I2 ) + (x3 − I3 ) · (x4 − I4 )
which can be expanded and ordered lexicographically to generate an appropriate innerproduct relation. We associate polynomial coefficients (which encapsulate I1 , I2 , I3 , I4 , r)
with ciphertexts; thus, security of this procedure follows directly from the attribute-hiding
security of Σ.

30

4.2.2

Achieving strong security for point functions with AIBE

In [OT10] the scheme is presented as an inner-product encryption scheme. A decryption
key associated with vector ~v can decrypt a ciphertext associated with vector ~x if and only if
~x ·~v = 0. To obtain AIBE, we instantiate this general construction with vectors of dimension
2. To encrypt to identity id ∈ Zq , use ciphertext vector ~x = (1, id); the decryption key for
identity id is the one associated with vector ~v = (id, −1).
In [OT10] the scheme is proven to be adaptively secure and weakly-attribute-hiding.
However, the “weak” property of the weakly attribute hiding security definition is not
relevant in the case of IBE (in the IBE instantiation, for each ~v there is a unique ~x such
that ~v · ~x = 0). Thus the same security proof for the scheme works in the context of the
Sim1 -security definition, with only one additional step needed.

4.2.3

Mathematical background

The scheme presented in [OT10] is based on cyclic groups of large prime order augmented
with a bilinear pairing operation.3 Pairing-based cryptography has become increasingly
popular in the past decade [DBS04]. Such schemes are typically based on a mapping
between two well-chosen cryptographic groups which allows for a problem in one group
to be reduced to a different (typically easier) problem in the other group.
Bilinear Pairings
Let G be a cyclic (additive) group of prime order q with generator G, and let GT be a cyclic
(multiplicative) group with the same order q. A bilinear pairing e : G × G → GT has the
following properties:
1. Bilinearity: e(sG, tG) = e(G, G)st for all s, t ∈ Zq .
2. Non-Degeneracy: e(G, G) is not the identity element of GT .
3. Computability: e(sG, tG) is computable in polynomial time for all s, t ∈ Zq .
The Decisional Linear (DLIN) Assumption
The decisional linear problem in G is to determine whether a+b = c given U, V, H, aU, bV, cH ∈
G. More formally, we define the advantage of an adversary A in deciding the DLIN problem
3

The canonical examples of bilinear pairings are the Weil and Tate pairings over elliptic curves.
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as:

AdvDLIN(A, G, λ) :=

Pr [U, V, H ← G; a, b ← Zq : A(U, V, H, aU, bV, (a + b)H) = 1] −
Pr [U, V, H, R ← G; a, b ← Zq : A(U, V, H, aU, bV, R) = 1]

The DLIN assumption is that AdvDLIN(A, G, λ) is negligible in λ for every PPT adversary
A. It is believed that the Decision Linear Problem is hard even in bilinear groups where
Decisional Diffie-Hellman is easy [BBS04].
Dual Pairing Vector Spaces
Let G be a cyclic group with generator G and bilinear pairing operation e : G × G → GT .
We write G additively and GT multiplicatively, so that e(sG, tG) = e(G, G)st .
Let V be the vector space Gn . We define a bilinear map e : V × V → GT as e(x, y) =
Qn

i=1 e(Xi , Yi ),

where x = (X1 , . . . , Xn ) and y = (Y1 , . . . , Yn ). The space V has a canonical

basis A = (a1 , . . . , an ), where ai = (0, . . . , 0, G, 0, . . . , 0).
| {z }
| {z }
i−1

n−i

A dual pairing vector space is such a vector space V along with dual orthonormal bases
B and B∗ . We define the following DPVS setup algorithm, which chooses the dual bases at
random:
DPVSSetup(1λ , n):

Choose a cyclic group G of prime order q, equipped with bilinear map

e : G × G → GT , for which the DLIN problem is hard with security parameter λ. Let
G be a generator of G. Define V := Gn with canonical basis A as described above.
Choose ψ ← Z∗q and X = (xij ) ← GL(n, Zq ). Set gT := e(G, G)ψ , and Y = (yij ) :=
P
P
ψ(X T )−1 . For i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, set bi := j xij aj and b∗i := j yij aj .
Return (params := (G, GT , e, gT , n, q), B := (b1 , . . . , bn ), B∗ := (b∗1 , . . . , b∗n )).
Let B = (b1 , . . . , bn ), and let a1 , . . . , an ∈ Zq . Then we define the notation (a1 , . . . , an )B =
Pn
In other words, (a1 , . . . , an )B is the vector whose coordinates with rei=1 ai bi .
spect to basis B are (a1 , . . . , an ). When (B, B∗ ) are dual orthonormal bases, we have


e (a1 , . . . , an )B , (c1 , . . . , cn )B∗ = (gT )~a·~c .
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4.2.4

The AIBE construction

For completeness, we describe the fully-secure FE scheme from [OT10]. Let DPVSSetup
be the DPVS setup routine described above. Then the scheme is given by the following
algorithms. Note that identities are elements of Zq , and payloads are elements of GT .
b := (b1 , b2 , b3 , b8 ) and
Setup(1λ ): Run (params, B, B∗ ) ← DPVSSetup(1λ , 8). Set B
b ∗ := (b∗ , b∗ , b∗ , b∗ , b∗ ). Arbitrarily select a plaintext space M ⊆ GT , where
B
1 2 3 6 7
b sk := B
b ∗ ).
|M| = poly(λ). Output (pk := (params, M, B),
KeyGen(sk, id): Choose σ, η1 , η2 ← Zq uniformly at random. Return
k := (1, σ id, −σ, 0, 0, η1 , η2 , 0)B∗

Enc(pk, id, m ∈ M): Choose ζ, ω, ϕ ← Zq uniformly at random. Return (c, c0 ) where:
c := (ζ, ω, ω id, 0, 0, 0, 0, ϕ)B

c0 := m(gT )ζ

Dec(k, (c, c0 )): Compute m := c0 /e(c, k). If m 6∈ M then output ⊥; otherwise output
m.
The original Okamoto-Takashima scheme [OT10] does not include the restriction on the
plaintext space having polynomial size. Instead, their decryption algorithm simply returns
m, which is random “gibberish” when a ciphertext is decrypted with an incorrect key. Note
that the decrypter cannot compare the key’s identity to that of the ciphertext, since the
ciphertext hides its associated identity. So to make the output of Dec explicitly match the
behavior of the IBE functionality, we must ensure that an error indicator ⊥ is returned when
the identities do not match. It is for this reason that we restrict M to have polynomial
size and perform a consistency check in Dec. Furthermore, we also use this restriction for
technical reasons in the security proof (briefly, the simulator must be able to determine the
discrete logarithm of the plaintext).
Theorem 4.2.2. This scheme is a straight-line-Sim1 -secure (Definition 3.4.2) AIBE scheme,
under the DLIN assumption.
Proof overview. We start by considering the real-world interaction of the Sim1 -security
definition, in which the adversary first receives a ciphertext Enc(pk, id∗ , m∗ ) and then is
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allowed to make queries to KeyGen(mk, ·). By Remark 4.1.2, we assume that the adversary
never makes two queries to KeyGen for the same identity. Then, through a series of
indistinguishable hybrids we obtain an interaction in which the ciphertext is distributed
independently of id∗ and m∗ . In fact, the values id∗ and m∗ are not needed until (and unless)
the adversary queries KeyGen on id∗ . Thus this final interaction serves as the required
simulation — it first gives the “dummy” ciphertext to the adversary. Then, whenever the
adversary queries KeyGen on id, the simulator queries F ((id∗ , m∗ ), ·) on id (here, F is the IBE
functionality). From the output of this query, the simulator can deduce whether id = id∗ ,
and if so, learn the value of m∗ . Then the simulator can appropriately generate a simulated
decryption key for identity id.
The sequence of hybrids is very similar to that used in the proof of weak-attribute-hiding
from [OT10]. However, in that security definition the adversary is not allowed to request a
decryption key for either of the challenge identities. In our security definition, the adversary
is free to request a decryption key on id∗ . Importantly, the adversary can request at most
one such key. Our main technical contribution in the security proof is to show that the
argument of [OT10] can withstand simulating at most one such key while still letting the
simulated ciphertext be distributed independently of the identity and plaintext.
Proof. We prove security in a sequence of hybrid interactions. We begin with a simulator
which has oracle access to the IBE functionality F ((id∗ , m∗ ), ·) but also receives id∗ and m∗
as input. Thus this simulator can perfectly simulate the real-interaction of the Sim1 -security
definition. Finally by the last hybrid, the simulator will not require id∗ and m∗ until these
are deduced from an oracle query.
Interaction 0: The simulator runs the Setup procedure of the scheme and generates the
ciphertext honestly as follows. It chooses ζ, ω, ϕ ← Zq and sets:
c := (ζ, ω, ω id∗ , 0, 0, 0, 0, ϕ)B ;

c0 := m∗ (gT )ζ

When the adversary queries its KeyGen oracle on identity id, the simulator queries its oracle
on id. If the output of the oracle is ⊥, then the simulator marks this identity as an incorrect
identity; otherwise it marks the identity as the correct identity. There is at most one correct
identity query. It then generates the corresponding key as follows. It chooses σ, η1 , η2 ← Zq
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and sets:
kid := (1, σ id, −σ, 0, 0, η1 , η2 , 0)B∗
The view of the adversary is thus identical to the real-world interaction of Sim1 -security
definition.
Interaction 1: Same as the previous interaction, except the simulator also chooses random
r1 , r2 ← Zq and generates the ciphertext as:
c := (ζ, ω, ω id∗ , r1 , r2 , 0, 0, ϕ)B ;

c0 = m∗ (gT )ζ

We call this ciphertext a semi-functional ciphertext. This interaction is indistinguishable
from the previous by the same reasoning as in [OT10], from the security of their “Problem
1” which follows from the DLIN assumption.
Interaction (2, h), for h ∈ {0, . . . , N }, where N is an upper bound on the number of KeyGen
queries made by the adversary. Interaction (2, 0) is defined to be the same as Interaction
1. For h > 0, Interaction (2, h) is defined to be the same as Interaction (2, h − 1) except
that when the adversary makes its hth incorrect identity query to KeyGen, the simulator
generates the corresponding decryption key as follows. It chooses random w1 , w2 ← Zq and
sets:
kid := (1, σ id, −σ, w1 , w2 , η1 , η2 , 0)B∗
We call keys of this form semi-functional keys. This interaction is indistinguishable from
the previous by the same reasoning as in [OT10], from the security of their “Problem 2”
which follows from the DLIN assumption. Since we also apply similar reasoning in a later
step, we give more details here:
Define ~xid = (1, id) and ~vid = (id, −1). The proof in [OT10] defines a “Problem 2”
game that involves the adversary distinguishing between two interactions (i.e., guessing a
random choice bit β ← {0, 1}). Relevant to the IBE scheme’s security proof, they show that
an adversary participating in the Problem 2 game can generate normal decryption keys,
semi-functional keys for any incorrect identity, as well as the following distributions (for
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the semi-functional ciphertext and the semi-functional h-th incorrect-identity key):
when β = 1 in the game

when β = 0 in the game
cid∗

:= (ζ, ω ~xid∗ , ~r, ~0, ϕ)B

kid := (1,

cid∗

σ ~vid , ~0, ~η , 0)B∗

:= (ζ, ω ~xid∗ , ρU~xid∗ , ~0, ϕ)B

kid := (1,

σ ~vid ,

τ Z~vid , ~η , 0)B∗

Here, ~r = (r1 , r2 ) and ~η = (η1 , η2 ) are uniform in Z2q ; ρ, τ are random in Zq ; and U and Z
are random 2 × 2 matrices subject to the constraint that U −1 = Z T . Now, since id 6= id∗ ,
we have that ~vid · ~xid∗ 6= 0. As such, the vectors ρU~xid∗ and τ Z~vid are random subject to
their inner product being nonzero. Now, it is with negligible probability that independently
random vectors have inner product zero; thus kid above is distributed statistically close to
a true semi-functional key (which has independent randomness instead of τ Z~vid ).
Thus an adversary participating in the Problem 2 game can induce a view statistically
close to that of Interaction (2, h − 1 + β). Since it is infeasible to guess β in Problem
2 with nonnegligible advantage, we have that Interactions (2, h − 1) and (2, h) are
indistinguishable.
Interaction 3: The same as Interaction (2, N ) except that if the adversary ever queries
KeyGen on the correct identity id∗ , then the simulator generates the corresponding key as
follows. It chooses random w1 , w2 ← Zq subject to the constraint that (w1 , w2 ) and (r1 , r2 )
are orthogonal, where r1 , r2 are the values from the ciphertext. It sets:
kid∗ := (1, σ id∗ , −σ, w1 , w2 , η1 , η2 , 0)B∗
The indistinguishability of this step follows from the same reasoning as above. However,
when applying the same reduction to Problem 2 as before, we have that ~vid · ~xid∗ = 0.
Thus the vectors ρU~xid∗ and τ Z~vid are random subject to their inner product being zero.
Indeed, this is exactly the distribution required by Interaction 3. Importantly, it is possible
to generate semi-functional keys for incorrect identities within the Problem 2 game. It is
not clear whether semi-functional keys for the correct identity can be generated within the
game. Thus, this interaction must be arranged last in the sequence of hybrids, and we can
only withstand one key for a correct identity.4
4

Similarly, the approach here does not appear to extend to higher-dimensional inner product encryptions,
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Let ~r = (r1 , r2 ) and w
~ = (w1 , w2 ). Note that in this interaction, the purported plaintext
in Dec(kid∗ , (c, c0 )) is computed as c0 /e(c, kid∗ ) = c0 /(gT )ζ+~r·w~ = m∗ /(gT )~r·w~ . Thus we can
equivalently say that the value w
~ chosen for kid∗ is distributed uniformly subject to the
constraint that Dec(kid∗ , (c, c0 )) = m∗ .
Interaction 4: The same as Interaction 3, except the ciphertext is generated as follows. The
simulator chooses ζ 0 , y1 , y2 ← Zq and then sets:
c := (ζ 0 , y1 , y2 , r1 , r2 , 0, 0, ϕ)B ;

c0 = m∗ (gT )ζ

As in the previous interaction, the values w1 , w2 in kid∗ are chosen randomly subject to
the constraint that Dec(kid∗ , (c, c0 )) = m∗ . We claim that interactions 3 & 4 are in fact
distributed identically. To see why, let S = (sij ) denote a randomly chosen 2 × 3 matrix,
and consider the following change of basis:
  
 
d1
b
I3
  
  1
 ..  
  .. 
 .  =  S I2
 . ;
  
 
I2
d8
b8

  
d∗
I −S T
 1  3
 ..  
 . =
I2
  
d∗8

 
b∗
  1
  .. 
 . 
 
I2
b∗8

Then D := (d1 , . . . , d8 ) and D∗ := (d∗1 , . . . , d∗8 ) are dual orthonormal bases. D differs from B
only in coordinates 4 & 5. These coordinates of B are not included as part of the public key,
so from the adversary’s point of view both (D, D∗ ) and (B, B∗ ) are equally consistent with
the public key.
when ~
x and ~v have high dimension. In that setting, there can be several distinct choices of ~v such that ~
x · ~v = 0.
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With respect to the basis pair (D, D∗ ), the ciphertext component c can be written as:
 
b
 1
.

c := (ζ, ω, ω id∗ , r1 , r2 , 0, 0, ϕ)  .. 
 
b8

I
 3

= (ζ, ω, ω id∗ , r1 , r2 , 0, 0, ϕ) −S I2





d1
 
  .. 
 . 
 
I2
d8



d1
 
.
= (ζ − s1,1 r1 − s2,1 r2 , ω − s1,2 r1 − s2,2 r2 , ω id∗ − s1,3 r1 − s2,3 r2 , r1 , r2 , 0, 0, ϕ)  .. 
|
{z
} |
{z
} |
{z
}
 
y1
y2
ζ0
d8

Since the entries of S are chosen uniformly at random, each of ζ 0 , y1 , y2 are uniform in Zq ,
as desired.
Similarly, the key corresponding to id can be expressed in the new basis as:
 
b∗
 1
.
kid := (1, σ id, −σ, w1 , w2 , η1 , η2 , 0)  .. 
 
b∗8

I ST
 3

= (1, σ id, −σ, w1 , w2 , η1 , η2 , 0) 
I2





d∗1
 
  .. 
 . 
 
I2
d∗8

= (1, σ id, −σ, w1 + s1,1 + s1,2 σ id − s1,3 σ , w2 + s2,1 + s2,2 σ id − s2,3 σ , η1 , η2 , 0)D∗
{z
} |
{z
}
|
w10

w20

Now, when id 6= id∗ (i.e., the simulator is servicing a query for an incorrect identity), w1 , w2
are chosen uniformly in Zq (independent of everything else). Thus w10 , w20 are uniform
as desired. When id = id∗ , (w1 , w2 ) are chosen uniformly subject to the constraint that
Dec(k, (c, c0 )) = m∗ . Since we are changing only the basis, k and c are exactly as before.
The change in basis has only affected the coordinates of B∗ /D∗ involving w1 , w2 ; thus these
values are still uniform subject to the same constraint, as desired.
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This final interaction defines our simulator. It first generates the ciphertext (c, c0 )
according to the distribution in Interaction 4. Note that despite m∗ appearing in the
description of how c0 is generated, the ciphertext is in fact distributed independently of
m∗ and id∗ , as required. Then, when the adversary queries KeyGen on id, the simulator
queries its oracle F ((id∗ , m∗ ), ·) and generates the resulting key accordingly, depending on
whether id = id∗ . In the case that id = id∗ , the simulator must choose w1 , w2 values (in kid∗ )
according to a particular constraint. To do so, the simulator must know the discrete log of
m∗ (the values in the constraint all appear “in the exponent”). For this reason, we require
the scheme’s plaintext space to have polynomial size. Finally, we note that the simulator
uses the adversary in a straight-line, black-box manner.
Theorem 4.2.3. This AIBE scheme is key verifiable (Definition 2.2.1).
b := (b1 , b2 , b3 , b8 ), and B
b ∈ pk. Knowledge of these basis
Proof overview. Recall that B
vectors allows the construction of four “test ciphertexts” that together ensure a secret key
exhibits the correct properties when paired with a valid ciphertext.
Proof. Our proof of correctness need only consider honestly-generated ciphertexts, that is,
ciphertexts of the form (c, c0 ) where
c := (ζ, ω, ω id, 0, 0, 0, 0, ϕ)B

c0 := m(gT )ζ

e Thus, to verify the validity of
To extract m, the decryption operation computes c0 /e(c, sk).
e for the identity id, we must show that e(c, sk)
e = (gT )ζ with overwhelming probability
sk
e = (s1 , . . . , s8 )B∗ ,
over the randomness used to generate c. We write c = (c1 , . . . , c8 )B and sk


e
and recall that e (c1 , . . . , c8 )B , (s1 , . . . , s8 )B∗ = (gT )c·sk . Thus, it suffices to show that the
e = P8 ci si = ζ. Substituting an honestly-generated ciphertext for c
inner product c · sk
i=1
yields:
ζs1 + ωs2 + ωids3 + ϕs8 = ζ
for all ζ, ω, ϕ ∈ Zq .
e has appropriate values for s1 , s2 , s3 , and s8 . Since the
Thus we need only verify that sk
b := (b1 , b2 , b3 , b8 ), we can construct ciphertexts to
public key pk includes the basis vectors B
check these values.
We construct a CheckKey algorithm that can be used to verify decryption keys:
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e id):
CheckKey(pk, sk,
e ∈ V. If not, abort and output 0. Then, ensure the following
Verify that sk
constraints hold:
e
e((1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0)B , sk)

= (gT )1

e
e((0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1)B , sk)

= (gT )0

e = (gT )0
e((0, 1, id, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0)B , sk)
e
e((0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0)B , sk)

6= (gT )0

If any of the constraints fail, abort and ouput 0. Otherwise return 1.
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Chapter 5

Connections to Static Obfuscation
In this chapter, we use mediated obfuscation to connect worst-case and average-case static
obfuscation. Briefly, an average-case (static) obfuscation of the KeyGen algorithm of a
suitable functional encryption scheme Σ yields a worst-case (static) obfuscation for Σ’s
functionality F . We use this connection to derive new impossibility results for average-case
(static) obfuscation.

5.1

Static Obfuscation

Definition 5.1.1 ([BGI+ 01, HMLS10]). (Obfu, Eval) is a static obfuscation scheme for a class
of functions C if for all f ∈ C and all x, we have Eval(Obfu(f, 1λ ), x) = f (x) with overwhelming
probability over the coins of Obfu. The scheme is virtual-black-box (VBB) secure if for all
PPT A, there exists a simulator S such that for all f :




Pr Of ← Obfu(f, 1λ ); A(Of , 1λ ) = 1 − Pr S f (1λ ) = 1 is negligible in λ.
The probability is over the coins of Obfu, A, and S. If the security condition holds only for a
random choice of f ← C, then the scheme is on-average-VBB-secure.
If the security condition holds when both A and S are given an additional arbitrary input
z (which may depend on f ), then the scheme is secure in the presence of auxiliary input.
In our generic construction for a mediated obfuscation of functions C, the client receives
a static ciphertext from the vendor and then essentially uses the mediator for oracle access
to the KeyGen algorithm of a functional encryption scheme. Now, if the KeyGen algorithm
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admits a static obfuscation (in the sense of [BGI+ 01, HMLS10]), then the client has no use
for the mediator. Intuitively, the ciphertext together with an appropriate static obfuscation
for KeyGen constitute a static obfuscation for C. In fact, the obfuscation of KeyGen need
only be secure on average (i.e., for a random choice of mk).
Theorem 5.1.2. Let (Setup, KeyGen, Enc, Dec) be a Sim1 -secure FE scheme with functionality
F and define C = {F (m, ·) | m}. If there is a static obfuscation scheme for the class1 of
functions {KeyGen(mk, ·) | mk} that is on-average-VBB-secure in the presence of auxiliary
input, then there is a VBB-secure static obfuscation scheme for the class C.
Proof. The static obfuscation for C is as follows:
• Obfu: Given m (the index of the function F (m, ·) to be evaluated) and security
parameter λ, generate (pk, mk) ← Setup(1λ ) and c ← Enc(pk, m). Also generate
O as a static obfuscation of KeyGen(mk, ·). Output (c, O).
• Eval: To evaluate such an obfuscation (c, O) on input x, first evaluate k ← O(x), then
output the result of Dec(k, c).
Correctness of this construction follows immediately from the correctness properties of the
functional encryption scheme and static obfuscation for KeyGen.
To show VBB security of this construction, let A be an arbitrary PPT adversary, and
consider an interaction in which A receives input (c, O, 1λ ). View its input (O, 1λ ) as an
obfuscation of a randomly chosen member of the class {KeyGen(mk, ·) | mk}, and the input
c as dependent auxiliary input. By the security of O, there exists a simulator S0 such that
for all m:


Pr (c, O) ← Obfu(hF (m, ·)i, 1λ ); A(c, O, 1λ ) = 1


KeyGen(mk,·)
− Pr (pk, mk) ← KeyGen(1λ ); S0
(Enc(pk, m), 1λ ) = 1 is negligible in λ.
Now by the Sim1 security of the FE scheme, we have that there exists another simulator S1
1

Technically, this class contains randomized functions, which are supported in the definitions for static
obfuscation of Hofheinz et al. [HMLS10] that we use here.
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such that for all m:


KeyGen(mk,·)
Pr (pk, mk) ← KeyGen(1λ ); S0
(Enc(pk, m), 1λ ) = 1
 F (m,·) λ

− Pr S1
(1 ) = 1 is negligible in λ.
By transitivity, S1 is our desired simulator for A.

5.2

Implications

Theorem 5.1.2 can be interpreted as a reduction from average-case (static) obfuscation to
the standard, worst-case (static) obfuscation. As a corollary, we see that an impossibility
result relating to an FE scheme’s functionality F can be “lifted” to an impossiblity result for
the scheme’s KeyGen function, as long as the FE scheme is Sim1 -secure.
In Section 4.2.2 we have given an AIBE scheme that indeed satisfies the Sim1 security
required by Theorem 5.1.2. Thus a suitable static obfuscation of its KeyGen procedure
would imply the existence of a static obfuscation of point functions with multi-bit output.
Obfuscation of point functions has been thoroughly studied [Can97, LPS04, Wee05, CD08,
CKVW10, BC10].

However, all of these results use either very strong computational

assumptions, or weak security definitions for obfuscation (or both).

In fact, several

impossibility results are known for obfuscating point functions, which can be used to derive
an impossibility for our KeyGen algorithm.
The above definitions of obfuscation consider only adversaries whose output is a single
bit. Wee [Wee05] shows that point-function (static) obfuscation is impossible against
adversaries with arbitrary-length output. Our Sim1 security definition for FE does allow
adversaries with arbitrary-length output, and the above proof goes through for arbitrarylength output if the obfuscation of KeyGen allows it. Our AIBE construction in Section 4.2.2
also has a black-box simulator, so when the simulator for the KeyGen-obfuscation is also
black-box, the resulting simulation in the proof (for static obfuscations of C = {F (m, ·) |
m}) is black-box. Again, Wee [Wee05] showed that it is impossible to obfuscate pointfunctions with a black-box simulator. Thus:
Corollary 5.2.1. The KeyGen algorithm of our construction (Section 4.2.2) has no static
obfuscation that is on-average-VBB-secure and either view-simulating or black-box, in the
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presence of the public key.
Recall that the KeyGen algorithm of an IBE scheme is a signing algorithm in a natural
digital signature scheme [BF01],2 and the auxiliary input we consider (an encryption of
(m, id)) can be derived from the verification key of this signature scheme. Thus it is quite
natural to consider the problem of statically obfuscating KeyGen algorithms in the presence
of such auxiliary input.
Roughly speaking, these results imply that the problem of obfuscating signature schemes
(with an on-average security guarantee that is highly natural for such settings) is related
to the problem of obfuscating point functions (with a more demanding worst-case security
guarantee). Progress in the former will be contingent on progress in the latter.

2

Observed by Naor but described in a paper by Boneh & Franklin.
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Chapter 6

Conclusion & Open Problems
Mediated obfuscation is a theoretical framework for program obfuscation that uses
interaction with a semi-trusted third-party to circumvent the general impossibility of static
obfuscation.
As demonstrated in Chapter 4, mediated obfuscation for point functions arises naturally
from fully attribute-hiding (i.e., anonymous) identity-based encryption, and the FE scheme
in [OT10] was shown to admit a relaxed-secure mediated obfuscation with relatively minor
modifications. Further study of the MO paradigm will benefit from instantiations based
on other fully attribute-hiding schemes (e.g. [LOS+ 10]) and pave the way toward the
development of theoretically optimal mediated obfuscation.
Furthermore, the development of strongly simulation-secure MO (i.e., schemes in which
the mediator learns nothing about the client’s input x, and security holds against entirely
corrupt mediators) would represent a major advance. Fully-secure MO would enable
vendors to outsource obfuscation without delegating total trust to the mediator, and
guarantee correctness of any value f (x) returned (to the client) by the mediator.
Finally (and perhaps most significantly), it remains to be seen if the mediated
obfuscation model can be extended to randomized functionalities. Such an advance would
likely coincide with the development of security definitions for FE that capture randomized
functionalities; thus far, no such definitions exist.
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